Harbaugh (1998a) has shown theoretically that charities can increase the size of donations by publicly acknowledging their donors using categories. In a complementary paper, using the data on the donations given by 146 lawyers to their alma mater law school, Harbaugh (1998b) provided empirical support for this theoretical assertion. Essentially, being acknowledged in categories gives donors some prestige bene…ts. In this paper, we experimentally investigate the impact of various reporting plans as described in Harbaugh (1998a and 1998b) on the behavior of donors. Our results show that, although the category reporting plan has no signi…cant impact on the size of donations when compared to the exact reporting plan and the no reporting plan, it does signi…cantly alter the charitable behavior of donors. We show that the presence of a category reporting plan induces the clustering of donations on the lower boundaries of categories, which suggests that donors are motivated by prestige. We also discover that in some circumstances the presence of prestige bene…ts crowds out the warm glow motive for giving.
Introduction
In the discourse of economics, human beings are typically seen as rational self-interested individuals seeking to maximize their utility, a utility derived from direct material payo¤s.
However, in reality human beings do not always behave in that manner. Many of them are willing to give away some of their hard-earned income to charitable causes. For This apparent inconsistency between the pursuit of individual utility maximization postulated by economic theories and the philanthropic behavior seen in real life has attracted much academic attention. Some possible explanations have been suggested. Kolm (1969) , Warr (1982) , Roberts (1984) , and Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) argued that people were altruistic. They did inherently care about the well-being of others and obtained positive utility from the public bene…ts that their donations gave rise to. Andreoni (1989 and argued that the pursuit of public bene…ts could not be the only motive for giving. In addition to public bene…ts, individuals might also obtain direct private bene…ts from the act of donating itself and would therefore donate in order to obtain these bene…ts. Andreoni (1989 and ) coined the term "warm glow bene…t"to describe this phenomenon.
Apart from warm glow bene…t, there are other types of non-monetary private bene…t that may motivate people to donate. Hollander (1990) pointed to the importance of receiving social approval as a motive for giving. The extent of social approval crucially depends on the di¤erence between one's own donations and the average donations of others in the reference group. Glazer and Konrad (1996) argued that individuals contributed to charities in an attempt to signal their wealth to others. Using contributions as a signal may be seen as more socially acceptable than using other types of signal, such as, for instance, conspicuous consumption. Harbaugh (1998a and 1998b) stressed the importance of prestige in motivating individuals to donate, the prestige being derived from donors having their donations made known to others. In these papers, he argued that, if indeed donors were motivated by prestige and the objective of charities was to maximize donations, charities could design a fundraising strategy that endowed donors with prestige. Harbaugh demonstrated that reporting donations in categories could realize such a strategy.
With the category-reporting plan, charities publicly announce individual donations according to pre-speci…ed categories that are ranked according to the size of the donation.
Those who donate a sum lower than the lowest amount in the lowest category will not have their donations publicly announced, and those who donate an amount that falls within a certain category will have their donations announced and given a certain status. There are many examples of this fundraising strategy in operation. For instance, The Illinois Valley Symphony Orchestra categorizes donors based on the size of their donations. 1 Donors are given a status as a contributor, sponsor, patron, guarantor, or sustainer if they donate amounts of, respectively, $25-$49, $50-$99, $100-$249, $250-$499, or over $500. Another example is Multiple Births Canada, a Canadian-based charity organization that provides support for multiple birth families and individuals in Canada. 2 Donors are given a status as a donor, supporter, friend of MBC, contributing member, sustaining member, patron, or founding member if they donate amounts of, respectively, $1-$249, $250-$499, $500-$999, $1,000-$4,999, $5,000-$9,999, $10,000-$29,999, or over $30,000.
Using data on donations given by 146 lawyers to their alma mater law school, Harbaugh (1998b) found empirical evidence showing that donors were indeed motivated by prestige and that the use of category reporting could increase the size of donations. Harbaugh's paper is the only empirical paper to date that systematically evaluates the impact of the widely used category reporting plan on the size of donations and empirically identi…es the existence of a prestige motive for giving. The lack of empirical evidence suggests that it is di¢ cult to empirically control for the relevant confounding factors and to isolate the impact of prestige on giving.
Some scholars have therefore resorted to an experimental approach as an alternative veri…cation tool. Andreoni and Petrie (2004) evaluated the use of fund-raising strategies that involved reporting the size of donations and revealing the identity of donors visually in laboratory experiments. They designed experimental treatments that allowed for the size 1 See http://www.ivso.org/ for more information. 2 See http://www.multiplebirthscanada.org/ for more information. In a laboratory experiment, Rege and Telle (2004) examined the impact of revealing the identities of contributors in a public good game on the size of contributions. They showed that revealing the identity of contributors increased the size of contributions.
Our paper also presents an experimental study on the role of prestige in stimulating people's incentive to contribute. However, in contrast to the related papers noted above, this paper focuses on the role of category reporting plans as outlined by Harbaugh (1998a and 1998b) and provides an experimental test of his theoretical assertions. In a series of experiments conducted at Fudan University in China, we compared the impact of various reporting strategies on the behavior of donors. Participants were undergraduate and graduate students with various faculty backgrounds. Our results show that, relative to our benchmark plan in which contributions were not publicly announced and full anonymity was preserved, the use of category reporting has an insigni…cant impact on the size of donations. However, it does change people's charitable behavior. We show that people tend to donate an amount that is equal to the lower boundary of the stated categories.
We also show that donors do not behave this way when donation categories are used but contributions are not announced. This result thus provides supporting evidence of the existence of a prestige motive for giving.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y discusses the Harbaugh model and its predictions. Section 3 describes our experimental design. Section 4 discusses our main results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
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Harbaugh (1998a) assumed that donors cared about warm glow, which is the utility derived from the act of giving itself, and prestige, which is the utility derived from having the amount of their donation and the category into which it falls known to others. These are both private bene…ts of giving and independent of how much others donate. Since a warm glow bene…t arises from the act of giving itself, it cannot be exploited by the charity. Prestige bene…ts, on the other hand, can be exploited by the charity since they are only obtained by donors when their donations are publicly announced.
The model assumes that donors ignore the public bene…ts of giving. Harbaugh (1998a) o¤ered two plausible justi…cations for this assumption. Firstly, he argued that small populations were often large enough to diminish the e¤ect of an individual's donation on public bene…ts to a negligible level. Secondly, many public goods provided using donations do not directly bene…t donors. For instance, donors who contribute to the relief e¤ort extended to the victims of a natural disaster taking place far away from their country do not get any direct public bene…ts from their donations. Likewise, donors who donate to Multiple Births Canada, the non-pro…t organization mentioned previously, could possibly be childless parents or parents without twins who will not obtain direct public bene…ts from the public goods provided by the organization.
It is also assumed in the model that warm glow and prestige bene…ts are independent of social interactions. It is true that a donor may care about his or her social status and is in ‡uenced by the donations of others. However, in the simultaneous contribution setting adopted by the model, donors cannot observe the donations of others when making their own donations, and consequently the warm glow and prestige bene…ts are not going to be a¤ected by social interactions. 3 Donors have the following utility function, U = U (x; p; d), which is increasing and concave in its arguments. Note that x denotes the consumption of private goods, p denotes the amount of prestige bene…t, and d denotes the warm glow bene…t. The budget constraint is given by m = d + x. It is assumed that there is no income taxation and 3 In a sequential contribution setting, Vesterlund (2003) shows that past donations can be used as a signal of the quality of a charity when donations are made sequentially. A high quality charity will therefore always announce past donations and be able to obtain larger donations. See also Romano and Yildirim (2001) and Potters, Sefton and Vesterlund (2005) for studies that look at sequential contribution setting and the impact of announcement of past donations on subsequent donations. Before the in ‡ection point we have @U=@x < @U=@d. An increase in d and a decrease in x will increase the total utility. Therefore, p must decrease in order to maintain the same utility level. After the in ‡ection point we have @U=@x > @U=@d, which implies that an increase in d and a decrease in x will decrease the total utility. In order to maintain the same utility level, p must increase. An increase in income m will shift the indi¤erence curve to the right, while an increase in the utility level will shift the indi¤erence curve upward.
The charity makes a public report r i about the size of individual i's donation d, and upon observing the report the society rewards this individual with prestige according to
1 denotes the sensitivity of prestige to reporting. The relationship between p and d is shown in Figure 1 .
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
A charity can employ any one of the following reporting plans. The …rst is the no reporting plan (NR), in which the charity does not report the size of the donations made by the donors. The second is the exact reporting plan (ER), in which the charity reports the exact size of the donations made. The third is the category reporting plan (CR), in which the charity reports the size of the donations made by the donors in terms of the category they fall into. The charity sets the minimum sum required for a donation to fall into a certain category. The size of prestige bene…t obtained from the donation of a certain sum di¤ers between reporting plans. However, the amount of warm glow bene…t obtained is independent of the reporting plan. As a utility-maximizing individual, a donor responds di¤erently to di¤erent reporting plans. Donors will adjust their optimal donations according to the reporting plan used.
The No Reporting Plan (NR)
Under the NR plan, the charity does not report the donations of individuals. Individuals are confronted with an anonymous donation campaign and therefore will not obtain any prestige. They choose an optimal amount to donate d 0 (see Figure 1 ).
The Exact Reporting Plan (ER)
Under the ER plan, the charity publicly reports the exact amounts donated by individuals. Thus, we have r = d. Donors translate the report made by the charity into prestige according to the relationship, p = d. The sensitivity of prestige p to reporting increases with factors that could add value to the report made by the charity, such as the fame, credibility, scale, and goodwill of the charity. Donors choose an optimal amount to donate d e (see Figure 1 ). Note that we have d 0 < de, which implies that the ER plan yields more donations than the NR plan. 
The Category Reporting Plan (CR)
Under the CR plan, the charity sets the threshold minimum amount for each category.
Suppose that the charity only uses one category and the minimum amount of donations to reach this category is set equal to d b . Donors who donate an amount below this threshold do not get their donations reported publicly and thus will not obtain any prestige. All in all, on the basis of the above model, we have the following empirical predictions:
1) the ER plan yields more donations than the NR plan; 2) the CR plan does not yield fewer donations than the NR plan; 3) the CR plan may yield more or fewer donations than the ER plan, depending on the size of the minimum threshold category d b ; and 4), under the CR plan, donors will donate an amount that is equal to the minimum threshold category d b .
Experimental Design and Procedures
We designed and conducted a series of laboratory experiments to verify the empirical predictions of the Harbaugh model. 4 Our experiments were carried out at Fudan University in China. 5 Our participants were undergraduate and graduate students from various faculty backgrounds. They were recruited through a campus-wide bulletin board system.
Altogether, we had 141 participants consisting of 51 males and 90 females. In terms of faculty backgrounds, we had 76 participants from the Faculty of Arts, 35 participants from the Faculty of Science and Engineering, and 28 participants from other faculties such as Business, Law, and Computing. Of these 141 participants, 98 were undergraduate students and 43 graduates.
We employed four di¤erent reporting plans, namely 1) the NR plan, 2) the ER plan,
3) the CR plan, and 4) the category no reporting (CNR) plan. The CNR plan is a variant of the CR plan without public announcement. Under this plan, we only inform donors privately about the category in which their donations qualify. Essentially, this scheme retains the use of category plan, but removes the prestige channel. Two levels of endowment, i.e. RM B 20 and RM B 50, were given to the participants. We only used one donation category (i.e. the star donor status) for the CR and CNR plans, but we varied the minimum size of donation required to qualify for this category. We used the minimum amounts of RM B 5, RM B 8, RM B 12, and RM B 16 for the CR and CNR 4 The experimental instructions, in both the original language (Chinese) and the English version, are available upon request from authors.
They can also be downloaded from http://www.expernomics.com/yer/research.htm. 5 Prior to conducting the main experiments, we carried out a pilot experiment at the National University of Singapore with 23 participants recruited among undergraduate students from various faculty backgrounds. Each participant had to decide how much of his or her endowment to donate and how much of it to keep. We conducted 6 experimental sessions, and we systematically distributed all 10 x 2 treatments that we had across these 6 sessions. Table 2 The presence of prestige e¤ ect could be deduced from pairwise comparisons between: 1) CR and CNR plans, 2) ER and NR plans, and 3) CR and NR plans. In the CR and CNR plans, participants were informed that when they donated an amount that was at least equal to the minimum threshold amount, they would be given "star donor " status.
In the CR plan, the status and identity of donors were publicly announced at the end of the session. In contrast, in the CNR plan, the status of donors was kept con…dential.
Any signi…cant di¤erence in the size of donations between these two plans could therefore be attributed to the prestige e¤ect.
Next, the main di¤erence between the ER and the NR plans was the presence of a public announcement of the exact size of donations given by each donor. All other things being equal, if the ER plan resulted in larger donations than the NR plan, then the additional size of donations obtained under the ER plan could also be attributed to the prestige e¤ect. Finally, the main di¤erences between the NR and CR plans were the presence of category reporting and the public announcement of donations. The model predicts that, as long as the minimum threshold category is set appropriately, there should be a greater number of donations under the CR plan than under the NR plan, if the donors care about prestige.
By examining the donation pattern of the donors under the NR plan, we were able to observe some natural sizes of donation (i.e. focal points). These focal donation points under the NR plan captured the warm glow motive of giving.
The main di¤erence between the NR plan and the CNR plan was the presence of categories. Since the prestige channel was muted under the CNR plan, we expected that there should be no di¤erence in the size of donation obtained under either plan. Thus, under the CNR plan, donors should donate an amount equal to any of the existing focal points found under the NR plan.
However, the use of categories under the CNR plan could also possibly have provided a reference point to donors concerning how much to donate. If this was indeed the case, we might have expected that the donors would donate an amount equal to this reference point rather than to any of the natural focal points. Consequently, we would have seen di¤erent donation patterns under both the NR and CNR plans. Whether or not the CNR plan would have generated more donations than the NR plan depended on the minimumthreshold category. If this was set too low, the size of donation was going to be lower under the former than under the latter.
Finally, under both ER and CR plans donations were publicly announced; however, the announcements were made in di¤erent ways. With ER, information on the exact size of donations was provided, while in the latter, only information on those donations that fell within the category was given. The Harbaugh model shows that whether or not the CR plan yields more donations than the ER plan depends on the size of the minimum threshold category to qualify for star donor status.
We ran both between-subject and within-subject analyses. We used the data from the NR treatment conducted in session 1, the ER treatment conducted in session 2, the CR treatments conducted in sessions 3 and 4, and the CNR treatments conducted in sessions 5 and 6 in our analysis. In Table 2 , we indicate all the treatments used in the analyses in bold fonts.
In the laboratory, each participant randomly picked a seat number as his or her identi…cation (ID) number. Participants were only identi…ed by these ID numbers and not by their personal identi…cations throughout our experiments. A seating plan was drawn on the blackboard at the front of the laboratory for all participants to see. Participants could also see each other without any obstruction. This was important to make the impact of public reporting more prominent. An instruction sheet, a series of allocation decision sheets, a survey form, and an endorsement letter from the bene…ciary of our experiments were placed inside an envelope. We placed one envelope on each seat. After all the participants had been seated, we read the instructions for the experiment aloud to them.
Participants were not allowed to communicate with each other.
The bene…ciary of our experiment was Fudan Student Home, a campus-wide charitable organization that provides support for the less privileged students of Fudan University.
All the donations collected from the experiment went to this charitable organization. The organization intends to use the money to cover its operating costs and to organize some activities for the bene…t of less privileged students.
In our experimental sessions involving the ER plan, we announced the exact amount of money donated by each participant and his or her ID number after all the participants had completed their allocation decisions. In our experimental sessions involving the CR plan, we announced the ID numbers of donors who quali…ed for star donor status.
Participants in a session had to complete several experimental treatments and make several allocation decisions in a random sequence to minimize the anchoring e¤ect.
Experimental Results
We mainly focused our analysis on the results obtained from our experiments with the RM B 20 endowment. 6 Table 3 below presents the descriptive statistics of our results.
Comparing Average Contributions across Treatments
As can be seen from the above table, average contributions across treatments with the RM B 20 endowment were RM B 8:07, which represented about 40% of the endowment.
There were several participants who allocated nothing to recipients, but there were also participants who gave all their endowment away. In what follows, we compare the average contributions across treatments.
The NR Plan vs. The ER Plan
From Table 3 , we observe that the average contributions under 1_N R20 and 2_ER20
were RM B 9:17 and RM B 8:68, respectively. According to the theory, they should be equal to, respectively, the optimal size of donations under the NR plan (d 0 ) and the optimal size of donations under the ER plan (d e ). We ran the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the equality of the means of donations. The p value obtained from the test was 0:7001 (see Table 4 below), implying that there was no signi…cant di¤erence between the two means of donations. This result contradicted the theoretical prediction of the model, which says that the sizes of donations should be higher under the ER plan than under the NR plan.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
The NR Plan vs. The CR Plan
We chose several thresholds of category for the CR plan; they were RM B 5, RM B 8, RM B 12, and RM B 16. In theory, the mean of contributions under the CR plan should be higher than that under the NR plan. We did not, however, …nd any supporting evidence for this theoretical prediction. The average contributions under the CR plan with the various thresholds were RM B 6:6, RM B 7:48, RM B 8:21, and RM B 8:92, respectively (see Table 3 ). The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests for the equality of the means between any of the CR treatments other than 3_CR20_1 (5 20), on the one hand, and the NR plan, on the other hand, yielded insigni…cant results (see Table 4 ). Only Our experimental results presented in Table 3 show that when the threshold of category was increased, the average level of donations accrued under the CR plan also increased. However, the same pattern was not observed under the CNR plan. The average level of donations increased when the category was increased from category 1 (4 20) to category 3 (12 20), but the level decreased sharply when the category was increased to category 4 (16 20) . This might suggest that the absence of a prestige channel under the CNR plan makes the higher category less attractive for donors.
Summary larger sizes of donation than the ER plan, however the di¤erence was not statistically signi…cant. Secondly, the NR plan yielded larger sizes of donation than the CR plans (with various category thresholds), however not all of the di¤erences were statistically signi…cant. Thirdly, the CR plans may or may not have dominated the ER plan depending on the size of the category threshold used. However, the di¤erences were also not statistically signi…cant. Finally, the level of donations under the CR plans may or may not have been higher than under the CNR plans. Thus, we did not …nd any evidence of the superiority of the CR plan in terms of generating donations.
Comparing Donation Distributions across Treatments
In what follows, we compared donation distributions across treatments. We plotted the histograms of donations and their normal density estimates. We also ran KolmogorovSmirnov tests to evaluate the equality of distributions. The results of these tests are shown in Table 5 below.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
The NR Plan vs. The ER Plan Several clusters of donations emerged under the NR plan, which was our baseline treatment. These cluster points could be considered as the "natural focal points" and they captured the warm glow motive for giving. Interestingly, these natural focal points were also found under the ER plan, suggesting that it was possible that people might not care about prestige under the ER plan. Otherwise, the two distributions would have had di¤erent patterns. However, it could also have been that the ER plan did not provide any, or enough, prestige bene…ts to donors, and consequently they might have ignored the existence of the ER plan and donated according to the natural focal points. Another possible interpretation would be that donors might have felt "uncomfortable"with having the exact size of their donation reported, and might have chosen to ignore the ER plan altogether. This might account for the fact that few charities actually use the ER plan in practice.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
We ran between-subject analyses comparing the NR treatments and the CR treatments under various category thresholds. The distributions of contributions under all these CR treatments are depicted in Figure 3 . When we compared Figure 2 and Figure 3 , in general we observed that there was a shift in the mode of donations under the CR treatments from a natural focal point into the category threshold. When the category threshold was set at category 1 (RM B 5), which is also one of the natural focal points under the NR plan, the majority of donations were clustered around this threshold. Interestingly, other clusters of donations around the remaining natural focal points under the NR plan became less prominent in our CR treatments. The result from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also showed that the two distributions were statistically di¤erent (the p value is 0:014).
Recall that the theory predicted that when the category was set too low (such that
, donors would ignore the category and prefer to donate an amount that was equal to the amount that would be donated in the absence of any reporting plan. This size of donation also re ‡ected the warm glow motive for giving. Under 1_N R20, we …nd that the majority of donors donated RM B 10 (see Figure 2) , which was higher than the category threshold of RM B 5. However, under 3_CR20_1 (5 20 When the category threshold was set at category 4 (RM B 16), we still observed a minor clustering of donations around the threshold amount, although it became much less prominent. Only less than one third of the participants were attracted to obtain star donor status. The remaining participants donated an amount that was equal to any of the natural focal points. If we examine the bottom-right plot depicted in Figure 3, we observe that donations are evenly distributed across the natural focal points and the threshold category. This evidence suggests that, when the threshold category is set "too high,"many donors ignore the prestige bene…ts. As a result, the contribution patterns in both treatments are not statistically di¤erent (the p value is 0:902).
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
Next, we ran probit regressions to evaluate the impact of the CR plan on the probability that donations were clustered around the minimum category amount. The results are presented in Table 6 below. The dependent variable took the value of 1 if the donation was equal to the minimum category amount (e.g. RM B 5 for category 1), and the value of 0 if it did not equal the minimum category amount. The coe¢ cients of the independent variable (NR dummy) in regressions 1, 2, and 3 were negative and statistically signi…cant, implying that the absence of the category plan (under the NR plan) signi…cantly reduces the probability of clustering around the minimum amount of the category. However, when the category was set at RM B 16, only 1 donor out of 47 donors donated at the minimum category amount. The price of prestige (RM B 16) was deemed too high by the donors. and donated nothing or only RM B 5, which was a natural focal point. Presumably, the spending RM B 16 to obtain prestige was deemed too high a price by the donors. When the category threshold was set too high, the two distributions did not di¤er statistically.
The p value obtained from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was 0:378.
[INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE]
The NR Plan vs. The CNR Plan
As shown earlier, the donors ignored the presence of category under the CNR plan and tended to donate an amount equal to any of the natural focal points. Accordingly, we should have observed similar patterns of donation distribution under both the CNR and NR plans. This is because the only thing that di¤ered between these two plans was the presence of category. However, unlike the CR plan, the CNR plan did not involve any public disclosure of donations that quali…ed for star donor status. Consequently, it did not enable donors to obtain prestige. If there was any di¤erence in the donation distributions between the two plans, it could be attributed to the presence of a reference point around the size of donation that donors should have made under the CNR plan.
In order to evaluate this, we ran the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality of donation distribution between the two plans. The results are shown in Table 5 . In three out of the four category levels that were used in our experiments (i.e. RM B 8, RM B 12, and RM B 16), we did not …nd any statistical di¤erence in the donation distributions between the NR and CNR plans. The p values obtained from the tests were 0:696, 0:330, and 0:081, respectively. On the basis of these results, we can conclude that, without any public reporting, donors tend to ignore the presence of category and behave in a similar manner to the one observed under the NR plan. This also implies that there is no evidence that the use of category creates a reference point concerning the size of donations that donors should make. However, for the low level of category threshold (i.e. RM B 5), we did …nd evidence of a reference point e¤ect. Under 1_N R20, the mode of donations was RM B 10, which is one of the natural focal points. However, under 3_CN R20_1 (5 20), the mode was equal to the threshold category of RM B 5. Under the CNR plan, the majority of the donors were exposed to a choice between donating an amount that they would naturally have donated in the absence of any category (e.g. RM B 10) and an amount that was equal to the category threshold. The latter may have given a signal to these donors that the charity needed a lesser amount of money than they would initially have thought.
Accordingly, many of these donors would have switched from giving RM B 10 to giving RM B 5.
We also ran probit regressions to evaluate the impact of the use of the category plan without reporting on the probability of donations clustering around the minimum category amount. The results are presented in Table 7 below. The dependent variable took the value of 1 if the donation equaled the minimum category amount (e.g. RM B
5 for category 1), and the value of 0 if it did not equal the minimum category amount.
It can be observed that the impact of the category plan on the probability of clustering around the minimum category amount is much weaker when the category status is not publicly disclosed compared to when it is publicly disclosed (see Table 6 ). The impact is signi…cant at the 5% level only in 3_CN R20_1 (5 20). In the other two treatment, it is either marginally signi…cant or not signi…cant at all.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]

Summary
To summarize, we found that when prestige bene…ts were "o¤ ered " under the CR plan, and the category threshold was not set too high, donors were attracted to donate an amount that was equal to the category threshold in an attempt to qualify for star donor status. This evidence suggests that donors are motivated by prestige when donating. However, under the CNR plan, where prestige bene…ts are absent, the majority of the donors tended to ignore the category and donate an amount that was equal to the amount donated under the NR plan, which also captured the warm-glow motive for giving. Interestingly, we found some evidence of the crowding out of the warm glow motive for giving when prestige bene…ts were present.
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There are several reasons why people give their hard-earned money away to charitable causes. They may be motivated by a sel ‡ess altruistic concern for the well-being of other people. 7 They may also be motivated by the positive utility derived from the act of donating money to others (i.e. the warm-glow bene…t of giving) and by other private bene…ts of giving. 8 In particular, Harbaugh (1998a and 1998b) points out the importance of the "prestige" donors derive from having their donations made known to others. Given that donors may be motivated by prestige and that the objective of charities is to maximize the size of donations, charities can design a fundraising strategy that invests donors with prestige.
Reporting donations by category and awarding donors star donor status is an example of that fundraising strategy. Using this strategy, charities set some pre-speci…ed categories and publicly announce donors who qualify for star donor status on the basis of their donations. Harbaugh (1998a) showed theoretically that the use of a category reporting plan could generate more donations than the use of either an exact reporting plan, in which the actual sizes of donations were reported, or a no reporting plan, in which donations were kept con…dential. In a companion paper, Harbaugh (1998b) showed that, under the category reporting plan, the prestige motive for giving did indeed exist. This paper presents an experimental analysis of Harbaugh's theoretical assertion.
Through a series of experiments conducted at Fudan University in China, we evaluated the impacts of various reporting plans on the giving behavior of the donors. Contrary to Harbaugh's theoretical assertion, our experimental results showed that, in terms of generating donations, the use of the category reporting plan is not superior to the use of either the exact reporting plan or the no reporting plan.
However, we did …nd strong evidence in support of Harbaugh's suggestion and empirical …nding that donors are motivated by prestige when donating. The use of the category reporting plan changed the charitable behavior of donors. When given an opportunity to obtain prestige bene…ts by having their donations announced and being given star donor status, donors tended to donate an amount that was equal to the minimum amount that 7 See for instance Kolm (1969) , Warr (1982) , Roberts (1984) , and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). 8 See for instance, Hollander (1990) , Glazer and Konrad (1996) , and Harbaugh (1998a and 1998b). would still enable them to qualify for the star donor status, provided that the category amount was not set too high. When the category amount was set too high, donors ignored the category. This also suggests that the demand for prestige is downward sloping.
More interestingly, we also discovered that in some circumstances the presence of prestige bene…ts crowded out the warm glow motive for giving.
Focal points, which essentially captured the warm glow motive for giving, also played an important role in the decision of a donor to donate. When the no reporting plan was used, the donors tended to donate at some natural focal points such as (RM B 0, RM B 5, RM B 10, and RM B 20). When the category was used, but donations were not publicly reported, the donation behavior of donors would be similar to the one found under the no reporting plan, when the category was not set too low. If the behavior had been di¤erent in these two settings, it might suggest that the use of category creates a reference point e¤ect. Given that we found a similar behavior under the two reporting plans, we can generally conclude that the use of category does not seem to create any reference point.
However, when the category was set too low, at RM B 5, the presence of category did induce many donors to donate an amount that was equal to RM B 5, even though their donations were not publicly reported. In this case, the presence of category may give a signal to donors that the charity only needs a lesser amount of money than the amount they initially thought of. Accordingly, many donors switched from giving RM B 10 to giving RM B 5.
A …nal caveat is in order. In our experimental setup, we only used one category for the CR plan and one for the CNR plan. In reality, charitable organizations use multiple categories. In future research, it would be interesting to extend our experimental study to one with multiple categories. On the basis of our result, we expect that the donors will self-select a donation category that suits them well. Donations are also going to be clustered around the category thresholds. 6 .77
The numb ers in the above cells denote the p-values obtained from the two-sample Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests for the equality of the means.* * Significant at the 1% level ** S ignificant at the 5% level *** Significant at the 10% level The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distributions. The n umbers in the above cells denote the p-values. * Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level *** Significant at the 10% level • * Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level.
• + There is only one observation of clustering around the minimum category amount out of 47 observations, implying that the CR4 plan never induces any clustering around the minimum category amount. The probit regression predicts failure perfectly. • * Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 10% level.
• + There is only one observation of clustering around the minimum category amount out of 47 observations, implying that the CNR4 plan never induces any clustering around the minimum category amount. The probit regression predicts failure perfectly. 
